A Comment on Nuclear Weapons -Proliferation, Deterrence and Export of Technologies
In preparation for an article on Autralian uranium exports, I spoke to a friend about the nuclear issue. Here is an edited and paraphrased version of a lively discussion.
My friend proposed an argument put to him by a colleague, namely that the idea of a British nuclear deterrent is now defunct because we, as “deterrers” can’t identify a “deterree” or adversary, we can only identify potential adversaries thus relying on speculation which is a poor basis for strategic planning.
My friend reckons that even if we could identify adversaries, use of such a weapon is unimaginable because it serves no practical purpose except obliteration which would be to admit failure and due to the likely response, tantamount to a nuclear attack on oneself:
“Even the US cannot identify an adversary in a unipolar world, again, only potentialities. Deterrence as an argument for the necessity of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war era is thus an empty one. Meanwhile, insisting on their necessity allows others to argue for their own right to nuclear weapons. This is the problem we face now in the form of proliferation.
“The post-cold war era nuclear issue is no longer about providing deterrence, but preventing proliferation. And nuclear bombs do nothing to deter that, in fact they encourage it. So proliferation is now a very imposing issue, and what’s more worrying is that the US administration (among others) has begun talking about the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons as a viable option to halt proliferation vis a vis Iran (which I liken to defusing a pub-row by “tactically” punching someone in the face).
“What this means is that we could see the first use of nuclear weapons, a breakdown of the “nuclear taboo” – which is what deterrence is based on – and a likely resulting nuclear arms race… all in the name of preventing proliferation. This would be the world shooting itself in the foot.”
I responded that deterrence is also complicated by what academics call “new wars” -i.e. the only real nuclear threats to the UK are small groups of home-grown urban terrorists using dirty bombs or smuggling the real thing in from a “rogue state”. You can’t deter against that with nuclear weapons because the government would have to respond by bombing itself.
Most nuclear countries would have real difficulty delivering a nuclear device to UK territory in missile form except by proxy -attacking an ally of Britain.
We do have countries to deter, but our nuclear weapons are of less concern to them than those of their neighbours. China, Pakistan, India, Iran, North Korea and Israel are the most likely candidates to use nuclear weapons and break the deterrence taboo if Bush doesn’t do it first. To be honest, I think UK and US nuclear capabilities are irrelevant in the East. I think those in the East are more worried about each other.
This could all change if Brown keeps up his campaign for another Cold War.
I’ve been reading UIC.com articles on each non-NPT/NPT contravening country. Here’s 70 pages summarised into 7 paragraphs:
Pakistan is getting nuclear technology from China and funding from the US. India is getting technology from Russia. Funding and uranium is on its way from the US and Australia once a few problems have been sorted out (namely that Australia is contravening its own policy on exports because India isn’t signatory to the NPT).
Israel got its technology from France and did some research with South Africa. Iran has used Siemens and Russia to build its plants and imported some undeclared uranium from China (only 1.8 tonnes though). North Korea has some Russian and indigenous reactors but is unique in that it didn’t even have a nuclear energy program to conceal its weapons efforts (although this is in the process of changing).
A complication for those trying to trace the source of uranium for nuclear weapons is that it’s easy to get hold of uranium for weapons -it doesn’t need to be imported:
“Perspective is relevant: As little as five tonnes of natural uranium is required to produce a nuclear weapon. Uranium is ubiquitous, and if cost is no object it could be recovered in such quantities from most granites, or from sea water – sources which would be quite uneconomic for commercial use. In contrast, world trade for electricity production is about 66,000 tonnes of uranium per year, all of which can be accounted for.” UIC.COM
Pakistan uses indigenous uranium for it’s weapons program which means uranium imports from China -and by association Australia -are irrelevant. The only exception is Iran, who don’t have enough indigenous uranium for a weapons program. However, they do have sea-water in the Persian Gulf which they could use.
Pakistan are the biggest threat -not only because Musharraf is on shaky ground. They have supplied North Korea and Libya with weapons technology in the past and have a much more advanced nuclear weapons program than Iran or North Korea. They have tested weapons in moves designed to threaten India.
A major issue that glares out of this reading is that, compared to problems in India, North Korea, Israel and Pakistan, Iran has been roughly trated by the international community. Of course they are in contravention of IEAE recommendations, but by comparison, we should be offering them some concessions to get them out of the situation -as has been done with the far more aggressive North Korea. Co-operation should include nuclear energy technology to improve Iran’s oil export earnings -as proposed by Russia. I interpret the failure to do this as a signal of the West’s intention to go to war with Iran rather than negotiate.
And just out of interest -I read an article on reprocessing nuclear war heads for use in energy production. Although the process doesn’t work the other way round (weapons-grade uranium must be highly enriched) -the high-grade uranium used in nuclear weapons can be diluted for use in electricity production. Not only does this address the proliferation issue, it also offsets around 10,600 tonnes of natural uramium that would otherwise be mined. For more information see “Military Warheads as a Source of Nuclear Fuel” from the World Nuclear Organisation.
Comments welcome on this complex issue.





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